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Abstract 6 
There has been an increasing focus on the development of automation in vehicles due its many 7 
potential benefits like safety, improved traffic efficiency, reduced emissions etc. One of the key 8 
factors influencing public acceptance of automated vehicle technologies is their level of trust. 9 
Development of trust is a dynamic process and needs to be calibrated to the correct levels for safe 10 
deployment to ensure appropriate use of such systems. One of the factors influencing trust is the 11 
knowledge provided to the driver about the system’s true capabilities and limitations. With a 56 12 
participant driving simulator study, the authors found that with the introduction of knowledge about 13 
the true capabilities and limitations of the automated system, trust in the automated system increased 14 
as compared to when no knowledge was provided about the system. Participants experienced two 15 
different types of automated systems: low capability automated system and high capability automated 16 
system. Interestingly, with the introduction of knowledge, the average trust levels for both low and 17 
high capability automated systems were similar. Based on the experimental results, the authors 18 
introduce the concept of informed safety, i.e., informing the drivers about the safety limits of the 19 
automated system to enable them to calibrate their trust in the system to an appropriate level.   20 
 21 
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1. Introduction 34 
In the last decade there has been a gradual increase of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) 35 
(e.g. Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Lane-Keep Assist etc.) in vehicles. More recently, there has 36 
been a push towards the introduction of higher levels of automation in vehicles with the aim of having 37 
Automated Driving (AD) features. The push towards ADAS and AD systems is driven due to their 38 
many potential benefits like increased safety leading to reducing the number of accidents (Tingvall, 39 
1997; Guériau et al., 2016; Cicchino, 2017), increased traffic throughput and road efficiency (Le Vine 40 
et al., 2016; Talebpour and Mahmassani, 2016), time and monetary savings on parking (Fagnant and 41 
Kockelman, 2015), lower emissions (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2014), decreasing drivers’ workload 42 
(Stanton and Young, 1998; Balfe, Sharples and Wilson, 2015) and providing more productive time to 43 
drivers (Cairns et al., 2014). 44 
While it is important to provide drivers the opportunity to use ADAS and AD systems (with 45 
development in technology), it is equally important to ensure that the drivers actually use the systems 46 
in order to ensure the potential benefits from the use of such systems are realized (Lee and See, 2004; 47 
Diels and Bos, 2016). Unfortunately, the usage of ADAS features like ACC and Lane Departure 48 
Warning has been low (51% of highway driving time (Eichelberger and McCartt, 2014)). Studies 49 
discussing the introduction of new technology in different domains like aviation, rail, automotive, etc. 50 
have shown that for the new technology to be accepted and used, effort needs to be made to introduce 51 
trust towards the new technology (Molesworth and Koo, 2016). Molesworth and Koo (2016) 52 
discussed that when participants were given a choice between conventionally piloted aircraft and 53 
remotely piloted aircraft (new technology), participants chose the former as they trusted it more. 54 
In the driving context, design and behaviour of ADAS and AD systems should be communicated to 55 
the driver (Stanton, Young and Mccaulder, 1997) and should be more human-like as it would make 56 
the driver-automation cooperation more transparent (Bifulco et al., 2013; Casner, Hutchins and 57 
Norman, 2016; Wang et al., 2016), leading to increased trust in the system. One of the challenges 58 
with the design of ADAS and AD is that their introduction changes drivers’ task from active 59 
engagement to passive monitoring (van den Beukel, van der Voort and Eger, 2016). Drivers’ driving 60 
task is said to have three different levels: 1) strategic 2) tactical and 3) operational (Michon, 1985). 61 
ADAS and AD systems alter these levels of driving tasks and the decision to design automation into 62 
any of the three levels is generally a trade-off decision (Johansson and Nilsson, 2016; Khastgir, 63 
Sivencrona, Dhadyalla, Billing, et al., 2017). The trade-off decision determines the level of 64 
engagement of the driver in the driving task. The shift from active engagement to passive monitoring 65 
introduces new types of potential errors (human errors) in the driving task as the human driver is not 66 
suitable for the task of monitoring monotonous systems (Fitts et al., 1951). 67 
1.1. Trust 68 
While introduction of automation assumes the removal of human error, in fairness it only shifts the 69 
human error from the driver to the designer of the system (Bainbridge, 1983). The designer of the 70 
automation makes assumptions about the best design for automation and distribution of driving tasks 71 
between the driver and the automated system. These assumption may or may not match with the 72 
drivers’ perception of the automated system and task distribution. Muir (1994) has suggested that as 73 
the automation capability or reliability increases, trust also increases. However, a mismatch between 74 
drivers’ perception and expectations about the capability of the automated system, and the designers’ 75 
assumptions can lead to misuse (due to mistrust), disuse (due to distrust) or abuse of the automated 76 
system (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). Misuse is a situation when the driver uses the automated 77 
systems for tasks it was not designed to perform and is caused due to mistrust, thus making the 78 
situation more unsafe than manual driving. Disuse is a situation when the driver doesn’t use the 79 
system in situations where the automation is suitable to use, due to distrust, thus not benefiting from 80 
the system. Thus, in order to ensure appropriate use of the system, it is essential to calibrate drivers’ 81 
trust to the appropriate level. 82 
Trust is one of the most important factors influencing use of automation (Muir, 1987; Lee and Moray, 83 
1992; Muir and Moray, 1996; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997; Parasuraman and Miller, 2004; Rudin-84 
Brown and Parker, 2004; Walker, Stanton and Salmon, 2016). Before the authors discuss details of 85 
the development of trust, it is important to define trust in driving context. In order to define trust, the 86 
authors adapt the definition of trust from (Lee and See, 2004) as, “a history dependent attitude that an 87 
agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and 88 
vulnerability”. The addition of the reference to “history dependent” is particularly important for this 89 
work because prior knowledge about the system’s capabilities and limitations affects an individual’s 90 
attitude towards a system, thus affecting their trust. Trust is said to be influenced by various factors 91 
(Lee and See, 2004; Xu et al., 2014; Walker, Stanton and Salmon, 2016), with previous work 92 
conducted by the authors suggesting this can also include knowledge, certification, situation 93 
awareness, workload, self-confidence, experience, consequence and willingness (Khastgir, Birrell, 94 
Dhadyalla and Jennings, 2017). In this paper, authors discuss the effect of knowledge on trust.  95 
1.1.1. Forms of trust 96 
Within scientific literature, trust is often discussed as a single construct. However, inspired by 97 
Rajaonah et al. (2008) who suggest two forms of trust: trust in automation and trust in the cooperation 98 
with automation; for the automotive context, the authors classify trust quantitatively into two forms: 99 
 Trust in the system  100 
 Trust with the system 101 
“Trust in the system” means the drivers’ trust in the capabilities of the system and/or in the system’s 102 
ability to do what it is supposed to do. “Trust with the system” means drivers’ awareness or attitude 103 
towards the limitations of the systems and their subsequent ability to adapt their use of the system to 104 
accommodate for the limitations in order to deliver the expected benefit from the system. Trust with 105 
the system implicitly means that the drivers are aware about the true capabilities, and limitations of 106 
the system, and are able to adapt their usage to overcome the limitations of the system in real-time. 107 
This paradigm of trust is going to be adopted in this paper. 108 
1.1.2. Knowledge: a factor influencing trust 109 
In order to have appropriate trust, is it important to convey the designer’s assumptions about the safe 110 
boundaries of the system to the driver. The knowledge of these boundaries provides the ability to have 111 
a safe cooperation with the automated system (Beller, Heesen and Vollrath, 2013). In the absence of 112 
such knowledge, drivers may not be able to calibrate their trust to an appropriate level (Lee and See, 113 
2004; Chavaillaz, Wastell and Sauer, 2016). While failures of automation has been proved to have a 114 
detrimental effect on trust, Lee and See (2004) argue that some failures can be classified as “good 115 
failures” with neglegible impact on trust. Good failures are those whose occurrence is predictable, 116 
which allows the driver to be prepared to accommodate for it. Predictability of failures of an 117 
automated system comes with knowledge about the true capabilities and limitations of the system. 118 
For complex systems requiring supervision, it has been argued that there is a need for an abstraction 119 
hierarchical representation of knowledge of the functional properties of the system (Rasmussen, 120 
1985). The abstraction hierarchy can potentially be done on two fronts. The first category is a 121 
whole/part of the system hierarchy, in which the system is viewed as a number of interacting sub-122 
systems working together at different physical levels (Rasmussen, 1985). The second category 123 
suggested in Rasmussen’s hierarchical knowledge representation is the abstraction of the functionality 124 
(Rasmussen, 1985). The physical form of the system represents the lowest level of abstraction. 125 
Moving up through the levels, physical functions represents the next level, next is generalized 126 
functions, abstract functions forms the penultimate level with functional purpose forming the highest 127 
level of knowledge abstraction. The higher abstraction levels do not just represent the abstraction of 128 
physical form, they provide knowledge about the control laws for the interactions of the functions at 129 
the lower levels. Moving up the abstraction levels provides a purpose of the task for the level below, 130 
while moving down the levels provides information about how the task will be achieved.  131 
When put in a driving context, the lower levels of abstraction represent the operational (as per Michon 132 
(1985)) driving task (means to a desired end goal) while the higher levels of abstraction represent the 133 
tactical and strategic driving tasks (defining the desired end goal). As priority is always given to 134 
higher levels of abstraction, a driver has to make a trade-off between the end goal (tactical / strategic 135 
goals) and means to achieve it (operational goals), to ensure the means to achieve the goal (lower 136 
levels of abstraction) lie within the safe boundaries of the system. In a manual driving task, such a 137 
trade-off has clear boundaries and represents a causal system (Rasmussen, 1985). The introduction of 138 
automation makes the driving task and the system more complex with blurred boundaries and no 139 
simple relationship between function and physical processes making it difficult to represent them as a 140 
causal system. Such systems are referred to as intentional systems. For intentional systems (ADAS 141 
and AD systems), decision making requires knowledge about the system, its limitations and the actual 142 
input to the system (from the environment) and a top-down approach to control the system in a safe 143 
manner (Rasmussen, 1985). 144 
1.1.3. Types of knowledge 145 
Based on literature (Rasmussen, 1985; Seppelt and Lee, 2007; Xu et al., 2014; Biassoni, Ruscio and 146 
Ciceri, 2016; Feldhütter et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2016; Bennett, 2017), the following classification for 147 
knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of automated systems was proposed by (Khastgir, 148 
Birrell, Dhadyalla and Jennings, 2017): 149 
 Static knowledge: Understanding of the functionality of the automated system (intentions 150 
behind the design of the system and functionality) (Larsson, 2012; Eichelberger and McCartt, 151 
2014). Static knowledge is administered prior to the driving task and is akin to an owner’s 152 
instruction manual, however with information at a higher abstraction level. Over time, a person 153 
can also build up static knowledge based on experiences. 154 
 Real time knowledge: or dynamic knowledge about the automated system (e.g. automation 155 
health, current state of the automation, near-future intentions of the automation). With the help 156 
of real-time information about the automated system health, drivers can be brought back “in-157 
to-the-loop” (Louw and Merat, 2017), as it helps increase their awareness (Banks and Stanton, 158 
2016) and increase transparency in the cooperation between humans and automation (Eriksson 159 
and Stanton, 2017). While in-vehicle information systems (IVISs) are known to have 160 
detrimental effect on driving performance (Peng, Boyle and Lee, 2014), they have a potential 161 
to have a contrasting effect in an automated vehicle as the driver is not actively involved in the 162 
driving task. Real time knowledge during repeated driving cycles leads to supplemental static 163 
knowledge of the driver about the capability and limitations of the system as it forms part of 164 
the consciously imparted knowledge driver brings to the next use of the automated system. 165 
 Internal mental model: Prior beliefs influenced of external sources (e.g. word of mouth, media 166 
etc.). Marketing of an automated system can affect the public trust and perception towards the 167 
product. This can potentially backfire if the information provided in marketing material is 168 
inaccurate as customers expect the systems to function as advertised (Casner, Hutchins and 169 
Norman, 2016). Inaccurate information can potentially cause over-trust or mistrust in the 170 
system. Internal mental model is the pre-conceived notion a person brings to the first use of 171 
automation, without any conscious effort to understand the system. While internal mental 172 
model is influenced by other sources, static knowledge is consciously imparted to a person prior 173 
to the use of automation. 174 
Comparing the presented knowledge classification with Rasmussen’s abstraction hierarchies, the 175 
authors suggest that static knowledge helps adopt a top-down approach, while dynamic knowledge 176 
helps adopt a bottom-up approach. Static knowledge further provides the ability to shift the decision 177 
making to a higher level or a lower abstraction level depending on the level of dynamic knowledge 178 
provided to the driver, i.e. to facilitate the user to more easily transition between levels of the 179 
abstraction hierarchy. With the introduction of automation, complexity of system increases, requiring 180 
drivers to demonstrate top-down (mean-end) reasoning approach to accommodate for deviations in 181 
performance while receiving knowledge about the operational driving parameters (bottom-up 182 
knowledge) (Rasmussen, 1985), to demonstrate their knowledge-based behaviour due to unfamiliar 183 
nature of the situations (Rasmussen, 1983). The significance of the abstraction hierarchies can be 184 
further illustrated by the fact that causes of failures or incorrect function are explained by a bottom-up 185 
approach whereas the reasons for the proper function are explained by a top-down approach  186 
(Rasmussen, 1985). 187 
Qualitatively, knowledge can potentially be classified into: 1) signals 2) signs and 3) symbols 188 
(Rasmussen, 1983). Signals which display time-space sensory data, help the drivers demonstrate skill-189 
based behaviour (based on intuition and experience). While signs indicate towards a stored rule, they 190 
do not provide the ability for drivers to process the situation in case a stored rule does not exist in 191 
their mental model. Symbols on the other hand represent the relationship between signs and provide 192 
the ability for drivers to demonstrate their knowledge-based behaviour and process the information to 193 
create a new rule (by shifting the processing to a higher or a lower level of abstraction). 194 
1.1.4. Creation of knowledge: identifying failures 195 
While, as described above, providing knowledge to the drivers has a potential of increasing trust, it 196 
needs to be stressed that the accuracy of the knowledge provided is key. Inaccurate knowledge plays a 197 
detrimental role in development of trust as it takes additional cognitive effort on the part of drivers to 198 
re-calibrate their mental model (initially formed in accordance to the inaccurate knowledge) to the 199 
true capabilities of the system as they experience the system (Beggiato and Krems, 2013).  200 
In order to create the knowledge of the true capabilities and functionality of the automated system 201 
(i.e., to identify failures), it is essential to conduct a thorough verification and validation process. 202 
Moreover, due to the safety critical nature of ADAS and AD systems, their deployment needs to be 203 
preceded by extensive testing to establish their safety level and performance boundaries (Sepulcre, 204 
Gozalvez and Hernandez, 2013). As discussed in section 1.1.2, the identification of failures helps 205 
classify them as “good failures” as it provides a level of predictability about them and thus do not 206 
have a detrimental effect of trust (Lee and See, 2004). However, knowledge creation about the 207 
capabilities and limitations of ADAS and AD systems faces reliability challenges (Khastgir, Birrell, 208 
Dhadyalla, Sivencrona, et al., 2017) and validation challenges which include challenges in test 209 
methods and test setup (Hendriks, Pelders and Tideman, 2010; Khastgir et al., 2015; Yu, Lin and 210 
Kim, 2016). While the authors consider knowledge creation as an important part of the process of 211 
development of trust, it remains out of scope of this paper and will be discussed in future publications. 212 
While defining trust in section 1.1, the authors mentioned that trust is a history dependent construct, 213 
suggesting its dynamic nature. The authors adopt the definition of calibration of trust as “the process 214 
of adjusting trust to correspond to an objective measure of trustworthiness” (Muir, 1994). Khastgir et 215 
al. (2017a) introduced five stages of calibration of trust: initial phase (stage 1), loss phase (stage 2), 216 
distrust phase (stage 3) and recovery phase (stage 4 and stage 5). There can be various intervention 217 
methods to potentially increase/adjust trust in different stages of calibration. In this paper, the authors 218 
discuss the use of static knowledge as an intervention method in the process of calibration of trust. 219 
1.2. Research Question 220 
As discussed in section 1.1, many authors have studied the effect of reliability (or automation 221 
capability) on trust (Muir, 1994; Muir and Moray, 1996; Chavaillaz, Wastell and Sauer, 2016), 222 
suggesting that with increased reliability, trust increases. However, there is no published research on 223 
the effect of static knowledge of automation capability on trust in a driving context (both “trust in the 224 
system” and “trust with the system”). With the help of a driving simulator study, this paper aims to 225 
answer the following two research questions: 226 
1. Does providing static knowledge about the automation capability of the system influence 227 
“trust in the system”? 228 
2. With static knowledge about the automation capability, does automation capability influence 229 
“trust in the system”? 230 
1.2.1. Hypothesis 231 
The authors hypothesize that static knowledge influences “trust in the system” as it would help 232 
influence drivers’ mental model and aid in them exercising their knowledge-based behaviour in 233 
unfamiliar situations. Furthermore, the authors believe that static knowledge would have limited 234 
effect on drivers’ “trust with the system” as drivers’ lack information about the automation health and 235 
its intentions. While static knowledge does provide an ability for drivers to predict failures, it does not 236 
help them understand the real-time tactical and operational driving task choices made by the 237 
automated system. 238 
This paper is organized in five sections. Section two discusses the methodology adopted for the study, 239 
section three illustrates the results of the study, section four provides a discussion on the results and 240 
the paper concludes with a conclusion in section five. 241 
2. Methodology 242 
2.1. Driving Simulator 243 
The experimental study was conducted in WMG’s 3xD simulator for Intelligent Vehicles at the 244 
University of Warwick, UK (WMG, 2017). The 3xD simulator consists of a Land Rover Evoque 245 
Built-Up Cab (BUC) which is housed inside a cylindrical screen of 8 m diameter and 3 m height. The 246 
cylindrical screen provides a 360⁰ field of view for the driver siting inside the BUC. A push button 247 
(with a backlight) (akin to an emergency stop button within a highly autonomous vehicle) was 248 
connected (hardwired) to a Raspberry Pi 2 board which in turn was connected to the 3xD simulator 249 
through a TCP/IP client-server interface. When the participants pressed the button, the backlight 250 
switched-off and the vehicle applied emergency braking and came to a stop. When the participant 251 
pressed the button again, the emergency brake was released and vehicle continued to drive in 252 
autonomous mode, with the backlight glowing again. This setup enabled a true user in the loop 253 
simulation platform, with the user being able to transition in and out of autonomous driving mode 254 
anytime they desired, rather than only at predefined, scripted simulator events. 255 
2.2. Participants 256 
Ethical approval for the experiment was secured from the University of Warwick’s Biomedical & 257 
Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) (REGO-2015-1746 AM02). Fifty six participants (16 258 
female and 40 male) were recruited for the study via email invitations. The mean age of the 259 
participants was 36.29 years (S.D. = 12.82 years). All participants were required to have a valid, UK 260 
full driving license and be at least 21 years of age. The average driving experience of the participants 261 
was 14.29 years (S.D. = 13.73 years). The participants’ assignment was counter balanced among three 262 
groups which were: 1) control group 2) low (20%) capability automation 3) high (80%) capability 263 
automation. The difference in automation capability is described in section 2.3.2. Informed consent 264 
was obtained from all participants. 265 
Out of the 56 participants who took part in the study, eight participants were not able to complete the 266 
study due to simulator sickness and technical issues while running the driving simulator. The 48 267 
participants who completed the study were assigned to three groups (see Table 1). 268 
Table 1: Study design: participant groups 269 
 Control Group: Without knowledge 
Group 1: Low 
capability automation 
Group 2: High 
capability automation 
Number of Participants 8 7 21 12 
Run 1 
Low capability 
automation 
High capability 
automation 
Without knowledge Without knowledge 
Run 2 
High capability 
automation 
Low capability 
automation 
With knowledge With knowledge 
2.3. Study Design 270 
The experiment was designed as a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design with automation capability as the 271 
between-subject factor, and knowledge of the automation capability as a within-subject factor. For the 272 
control group, automation capability was used as a within-in subject factor to evaluate whether trust 273 
increased with experience without providing any knowledge to the driver (participant) about the 274 
automation capability. As a part of the study, each participant was driven in automated mode (SAE 275 
Level 4 as per SAE J3016 (SAE, 2018)) twice and witnessed five hazardous incidents during each 276 
complete run. Since the study was evaluating SAE Level 4 automation, participants were asked to sit 277 
in the front passenger’s seat and hold the emergency stop button in their hands. Such an arrangement 278 
also ensured that the participants could only use the button (instead of brake pedal) to stop the vehicle. 279 
They were further informed that when the emergency stop button was pressed, the vehicle will apply 280 
emergency brakes and will need to cover the braking distance depending on the speed of the vehicle. 281 
In cases where the participant met with a simulated accident, the run ended abruptly. The driving 282 
simulator route for the experiment involved a drive around the University of Warwick campus. Each 283 
complete run lasted around 10 minutes. The route around University of Warwick was chosen to 284 
provide a better immersive environment for the participants as most of them were familiar with the 285 
university campus. Additionally, the University of Warwick route in the 3xD simulator has photo-286 
realistic imagery and realistic road feedback (vibration) due to a LiDAR scan input which forms the 287 
base for the simulation environment. The speed of the automated vehicle was according to the speed 288 
limits set on the campus map, ranging from 10-30 miles per hour. 289 
In order to overcome the lack of real-world consequences often experienced by simulation 290 
participants, who can easily choose not to react as they might if their own life were in jeopardy (as in 291 
real-world), the study had a gamification aspect to it. The game gave participants a goal during the 292 
experiment run and added an element of risk to the study (Table 2). Both these factors have been 293 
discussed in section 1.1 as being essential to evaluate development of trust. Participants were awarded 294 
1 point for every second they spent in automated mode. Every time they pressed the button, the button 295 
press was classified as a “correct stop” or an “incorrect stop”. For every correct stop they were 296 
awarded a bonus of 200 points and for every incorrect stop, a penalty of 200 points. Before the run, 297 
they were further provided information about what defined a correct and an incorrect stop. A correct 298 
stop was one where the participant correctly identified that the automated system wouldn’t be able to 299 
handle the situation, prompting the participant to intervene and press the emergency stop button. An 300 
incorrect stop was one in which the participant pressed the emergency stop button and brought the 301 
vehicle to standstill, even though the automated system was capable of handling the situation. 302 
Additionally, in case any participant crashed (met an accident), a penalty of 10000 points was given 303 
and the experiment run came to an end.  304 
An extremely high penalty was added for a crash to add a high degree of risk and motivate 305 
participants to avoid crashing the vehicle as perceived risk influences driver’s interaction with the 306 
automated system (Eriksson, Banks and Stanton, 2017). The penalties were added to get the 307 
participants to react in a similar manner as if they were in real danger. The participants were asked to 308 
maximise their score. However, the score was not a variable within the study. It was more of a 309 
mechanism to encourage engagement in the task. Participants were provided information about their 310 
score after the study was completed. Participants were given two objectives: 1) avoid crashing the 311 
vehicle by pressing the button (emergency stop) 2) maximize time spent in automated mode. They 312 
were asked to press the button only if they felt that the automated system couldn’t handle the situation 313 
or if they felt unsure about the automated system’s performance. 314 
Table 2: Scoring criteria for study (gamification) 315 
Type of Action Points 
Automated mode 1 / second 
Correct Stoppage of the automated vehicle +200 
Incorrect Stoppage of the automated vehicle -200 
Crash -10000 
 316 
2.3.1. Hazards 317 
In order to choose the five hazardous events, a hazard analysis of an automated vehicle was conducted 318 
as per the ISO 26262 (ISO, 2011) functional safety process. Five different automated vehicle 319 
functions were identified and a hazard was identified for each of the functions (Table 3). For each 320 
hazard, a hazardous event was identified which was created in each of the driving scenarios in the 321 
experiment runs in the 3xD simulator. The hazard and hazardous event identification was done by 322 
independent safety experts. One of the factors influencing the selection of the hazardous events was 323 
the ability to create the events in the 3xD simulator. 324 
Table 3: Description of five hazardous events 325 
Function Hazard Hazardous event description 
Braking Lack of Braking 
Pedestrian suddenly changes direction and comes in front of the ego 
vehicle (automated vehicle) 
Torque 
Excessive torque – 
excessive acceleration 
Vehicle approaching round-about and accelerates instead of braking 
Object Detection 
Blind-spot and delayed 
object detection 
Another vehicle in perpendicular lane comes in path of the ego vehicle 
suddenly 
Path Planning 
Not following rules of 
road  
Ego vehicle joins a roundabout while another vehicle is still in the 
roundabout and has right of way. 
Object Detection 
Compromised detection 
due to environmental 
factors 
In foggy/rainy weather, ego vehicle is not able to detect traffic lights 
within the specified range. 
 326 
2.3.2. Automation Capability 327 
Two levels of automation capability were used in the study: 1) low capability automation 2) high 328 
capability automation. The difference between the two systems was based on the ability of the 329 
automated system to tackle the five hazardous events mentioned in section 2.3.1. Low capability 330 
automated system was able to handle one out of the five hazardous events, requiring the driver to 331 
intervene in four hazardous events to ensure safe performance of the vehicle. High capability 332 
automated system was able to handle four out of the five hazardous events, requiring the driver to 333 
intervene in only one hazardous event situation to ensure safe performance. 334 
2.4. Procedure 335 
When participants arrived for the experiment, they were initially briefed about the experiment 336 
following which informed consent was taken from each participant and they were asked to fill in a 337 
demographic questionnaire. Before the start of the study runs, each participant was given a trial run 338 
(on a route different from the one used for the study runs) on the driving simulator with a researcher 339 
seated next to the participant, to familiarize the participant with the visuals, motion feedback, 340 
experience of sitting inside a car within a simulator and using the button to apply emergency brake on 341 
the vehicle. Participants were told that they can ask for as many trial runs as they wish, in order to 342 
make them comfortable with the simulator environment. Each trial run was of five minutes in length. 343 
While most of the participants requested only one trial run, some participants requested for an 344 
additional (second) trial run. After the trial runs, participants were asked whether they would like to 345 
continue the study. In the case that the participant agreed, each participant experienced two 346 
experiment runs of around 10 minutes each. Before the second run (for group 1 and group 2), 347 
participants were provided knowledge about the capabilities of the automated system. Commentary 348 
was read out to them via a prepared script. Effort was put into the preparation of the script in order to 349 
avoid introducing any experiment bias. The script was reviewed by three independent human factors 350 
experts. 351 
For the control group, participants were told that in the two runs, they will experience automated 352 
control systems from two different suppliers. No other information about system capabilities was 353 
given. However, before the second run, it was reiterated that the participants will now experience a 354 
different automated control system from a different supplier. Such a design of the control group was 355 
implemented to check if there was any changes in the trust levels due to experience. Eight out of 15 356 
participants in the control group experienced low capability automation in their first run and high 357 
capability automation in their second run. The remaining seven participants experienced the runs in 358 
the reverse order. 359 
At the end of each experiment run, participants were asked to fill a trust rating questionnaire (section 360 
2.4.2), Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) (Kennedy et al., 1993), and Van Der Laan’s 361 
acceptance questionnaire (Van Der Laan, Heino and De Waard, 1997). However, the results from the 362 
latter two haven’t been included in this paper. 363 
2.4.1. Imparting knowledge 364 
Knowledge was imparted to the participants via a prepared script which included illustrations 365 
regarding the automated systems’ capability and limitations. Special care was taken to ensure that 366 
participant’s mental model was informed so that they understood the functioning of the system in a 367 
lay-man language to ensure higher level system understanding. This was particularly important in 368 
order to ensure they were imparted with knowledge-based behaviour, as compared to rule-based or 369 
skill-based behaviour. The knowledge imparted would enable them to deal with the unfamiliar 370 
situation by transferring the cognitive task to a higher level or a lower level of abstraction in search of 371 
an existing rule or intuition of their mental model (Rasmussen, 1985). In the automated driving 372 
context, the significance of knowledge-based behaviour is further emphasized as it helps a driver 373 
adopt a means-end approach to execute the appropriate human intervention needed for the task. The 374 
following two scripts are examples of the how knowledge was imparted to the participants. 375 
Example 1: “The automated control system from the supplier is based on camera based sensors and 376 
each automated control system will be trialled in separate runs in the sim. However, due to cost 377 
pressures, they have chosen a single low quality camera with reduced field of view. 378 
Vision based systems are dependent on the quality of the camera used. Due to cost pressures, the 379 
supplier has compromised with the accuracy of the camera used for the vehicle. In this vehicle, a 380 
lower grade camera has been used. Lower grade cameras are vulnerable to environmental factors 381 
and image recognition degrades with lower visibility. E.g., certain cameras find it hard to detect 382 
objects in rain, snow or fog or at certain times of the day due to image washout (Figure 1). In your 383 
drive today, you might have witnessed bright sunlight or rain. You have the luxury of using 384 
sunglasses, wipers etc. However, Camera doesn’t have that. It has been found that light colour 385 
objects against a bright sky is difficult to detect. This was the case in the recent Tesla Model S crash 386 
(NHTSA, 2017) where the white rear end of the truck was not detected against the bright sky.” 387 
 388 
 389 
Example 2: “While, automated vehicles have a repeatable and predictable behaviour, their behaviour 390 
is “programmed” by human engineer. Every vehicle before being released to market undergoes 391 
rigorous testing. However, it is possible that sometimes a programming bug introduced by a human 392 
error manifests itself into a larger failure. The rules of the road are pre-programmed into the 393 
automated control system. The automated system in your next run is a pre-production control system 394 
and is still undergoing testing. While previous test results have been extremely positive, I advise you 395 
to take caution. An example of this might be that as a driver, we know that if a pedestrian is standing 396 
next to a zebra crossing, they have the right of way (Figure 2). However, for a camera system, he/she 397 
will only be a pedestrian with unknown intention. In this example the automated control system 398 
wouldn’t know the rules of the road and will not have the understanding of the priorities.  399 
Another rule of the road that we as drivers are used to is the priorities at roundabouts and junctions 400 
(Figure 2). Imagine a person is given a driving license when he/she doesn’t know the rules of the 401 
road. Not only its dangerous for him/her, it is hazardous for the traffic around.” 402 
 403 
 404 
Figure 1: Camera view while driving in fog  
(image source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/kubina/2160242894; date accessed: 2017-12-04) 
Figure 2: Rules of road: rule 19 (left) and rule 185(right). (DfT, 2017)  
In the above examples, effort was made to differentiate between knowledge and rule-based 405 
behaviours. Simple rules are comparatively easy to convey to participants, for Figure 1, a rule would 406 
be ‘automated system will not work in fog’. However, there is no understanding why it will not work 407 
(e.g. image recognition degrades with lower visibility which was provided as a part of the script). 408 
Knowledge about other similar situation where the camera may not work was also provided via the 409 
script (…hard to detect objects in rain, snow or fog or at certain times of the day); (You have the 410 
luxury of using sunglasses, wipers etc. However, Camera doesn’t have that. It has been found that 411 
light colour objects against a bright sky is difficult to detect. This was the case in the recent Tesla 412 
Model S crash where the white rear end of the truck was not detected against the bright sky). By 413 
trying to impart knowledge the participant can envisage their own varied and numerous situations 414 
where the automated system might act unexpectedly. 415 
2.4.2. Trust questionnaire 416 
At the end of each of the two experiment runs, participants were asked to rate their level of “trust in 417 
the system” and “trust with the system”. A subjective rating scale was used and participants were 418 
asked to draw a line across a 100 mm box to indicate their level of trust (c.f. (Muir and Moray, 1996; 419 
Rajaonah, Anceaux and Vienne, 2006)). Before being asked to rate different trust levels, participants 420 
were briefed about the difference in the different types of trust via a prepared script which included 421 
examples (was read to the participants as well as given in text form) to highlight the difference 422 
between “trust in the system” and “trust with the system”. Existing rating scales like Jian’s scale 423 
(Jian, Bisantz and Drury, 2000), couldn’t be used as they don’t classify trust into the two components 424 
mentioned in section 1.1. In order to explain the two different concepts of trust, participants were 425 
briefed using an example of a mobile phone and call service provider. The following text was used for 426 
the explanation: 427 
“Trust in the system means that you have trust in the capabilities of the system and in its ability to do 428 
what it is supposed to do as advertised to you. In other words, it does what it says on the box. Trust with 429 
the system means that you are aware of the limitations of the systems and you adapt your use of the 430 
system to accommodate for the limitations in order to get maximum benefit from the system. 431 
For example, if you buy a mobile phone, you have trust in the systems about its advertised 432 
capabilities. You develop trust with the system once you start using it and understand its limitations. 433 
Ability to work with limitations guides your trust with the system. For the mobile phone and the call 434 
service provider you have, you get call drop-outs in certain part of our house and not in another part 435 
of your house. You would adapt your usage of the mobile phone by making calls only when you are in 436 
a part of the house where you know call connection service is good. This is an example of you 437 
acknowledging the limitations of the system, adapting your usage and developing trust with the 438 
system” 439 
On the trust scale, a 0% rating suggested very low trust and 100% suggested very high trust. As trust 440 
is a continuum, any value in between 0 -100 suggests that the participant had partial trust. 441 
3. Results 442 
3.1. Trust levels 443 
The average “trust in the system” for low capability automation increased substantially from 32.4% to 444 
65.4 %, with the introduction of knowledge about the system capabilities and limitations (Figure 3). 445 
While an increase in “trust in the system” rating with the introduction of knowledge was seen for high 446 
capability automation from 54.2% to 70.5% also, the effect was comparatively lower. It is interesting 447 
to note that with the introduction of knowledge about the automated system’s capabilities and 448 
limitations, both median and mean values for “trust in the system” for low-capability and high-449 
capability automated system were similar (Figure 3). In the low capability automation group, barring 450 
two participants out of the 21 participants, all participants showed an increase in trust in the system 451 
with the introduction of knowledge (Figure 4). High capability automation group also showed a 452 
similar trend. The box-plots for trust in the system illustrate a higher convergence in trust ratings with 453 
the introduction of knowledge, potentially due to appropriate calibration of trust level (Figure 3).  454 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the “trust in the system” and “trust with the 455 
system” ratings with automation capability as the between factor variable and knowledge as the 456 
within factor variable. The introduction of knowledge about the automation capabilities and 457 
limitations had a highly significant statistical effect on the level of “trust in the system”, F (1, 31) = 458 
33.712, p = 0.000002 with a ηp2 = 0.521, suggesting 52.1% of the variance being associated with the 459 
introduction of knowledge. The introduction of knowledge didn’t have an interaction effect with 460 
automation capability, F (1, 31) = 3.846, p = 0.059 (ηp2 = 0.11). Therefore, there was no effect of 461 
automation capability on trust in the system ratings when knowledge was introduced. 462 
While the average “trust with the system” changed with the introduction of knowledge (Figure 5), the 463 
effect was statistically insignificant, F (1, 31) = 3.652, p = 0.065 with a ηp2 = 0.105. There was no 464 
interaction effect between knowledge and automation capability for trust with the system ratings, F (1, 465 
31) = 0.742, p = 0.396 (ηp2 = 0.023).  466 
In order to negate the effect of experience on trust ratings, a repeated measures ANOVA was 467 
performed on the control group. The effect of the runs was statistically highly insignificant on the 468 
level of “trust in the system”, F (1, 13) = 0.105, p = 0.751 with a ηp2 = 0.008. There were no 469 
interaction effects between the runs and the two control groups, F (1, 13) = 0.020, p = 0.89 (ηp2 = 470 
0.002). 471 
 472 
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Figure 3: Box-plots of Trust-In the system ratings (highlighting average trust ratings) (central dot represents average 
value) 
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 475 
 476 
3.2. False presses 477 
While the introduction of knowledge about system capabilities and limitations increased trust in the 478 
system for both low and high capability automation, it had contrasting effect in the two groups in 479 
terms of number of false presses. The authors define a false press as a button press in a situation 480 
which could be handled by the automated system, indicating distrust in the system. 481 
For low capability automation, the average number of false presses increased significantly from 0.47 482 
to 2.67 with the introduction of knowledge. On the contrary, for high capability automation the 483 
average number of false presses decreased from 1.73 to 1.36 with the introduction of knowledge 484 
(Figure 6). The outlier data from the box-plot were removed for mean calculation. This meant one 485 
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Figure 4: “Trust in the System” level of individual participants for low capability and high capability automation 
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Figure 5: Box-plots of Trust-With the system ratings (central dot represents average value) 
data point each from the two runs for high capability automation was removed. There were no outliers 486 
in the data set for low capability automation group. 487 
A paired-sample t-Test was conducted to assess the significance in the number of false presses with 488 
the introduction of knowledge. For low capability automation, there was a statistically significant 489 
difference in the number of False Presses for without knowledge run (M = 0.47, SD = 0.60) and 490 
knowledge run (M = 2.67, SD = 1.65); t (20) = -6.398, p = 0.000003. For high capability automation, 491 
the number of False Presses (FP) for without knowledge run (M = 2.41, SD = 2.79) and knowledge 492 
run (M = 1.67, SD = 1.43) was statistically insignificant; t (11) = 0.792, p = 0.445. 493 
As discussed in section 2.4.1, for the low capability automation group, participants were given a lot of 494 
knowledge based on the automated systems’ limited capability. One of the potential reasons for the 495 
contrasting results between the two groups could be the amount of knowledge provided in the low 496 
capability automation group and the participants’ ability to process all the knowledge, develop 497 
accurate mental model and display knowledge-based behaviour. However, higher trust ratings with 498 
introduction of knowledge suggest that knowledge-based behaviour was displayed. Another potential 499 
reason for the contradictory results could be the lack of dynamic (real-time) knowledge provided to 500 
the participants (discussed in section 4). 501 
 502 
 503 
3.3. Accidents 504 
The authors define an accident as a collision of the ego vehicle (automated vehicle) with other entities 505 
(vehicles, pedestrians or cyclists) in the scenario or if the own vehicle doesn’t follow the traffic light 506 
rules. Introduction of knowledge about the automated system capability had similar effect on the 507 
average number of accidents for both the automation groups. For low capability automation, the 508 
average number of accidents reduced significantly from 1 to 0.38 with the introduction of knowledge 509 
(Figure 7). For high capability automation, the average number of accidents reduced slightly from 510 
0.58 to 0.42 (Figure 7). It is interesting to note that most of the accidents were caused to due to late 511 
interventions rather than absence of interventions. This may be explained due to lack of accurate 512 
situation awareness about scenario handling capabilities of the automated system during the 513 
automated driving scenario which could potentially be due to the lack of dynamic knowledge of the 514 
participants. A paired sample t-Test was conducted to assess the statistical significance in the number 515 
of accidents with the introduction of knowledge. There was a statistically significant difference in the 516 
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Figure 6: Average number of false presses 
number of accidents between the without knowledge (M = 1, SD = 0) and with knowledge (M = 0.38, 517 
SD = 0.49) conditions; t (20) = 5.701, p = 0.000014, for low capability system. 518 
Similar to the false presses, the number of accidents for without knowledge (M = 0.5, SD = .52) and 519 
with knowledge runs (M = 0.42, SD = 0.51) conditions for high capability automation was 520 
insignificant; t (11) = 0.321, p = 0.754. 521 
 522 
 523 
4. Discussion 524 
As mentioned in section 1.1.1, “trust in the system” refers to the capability of the system where as 525 
“trust with the system” refers to the ability of the driver to work with the system. In the study 526 
presented, the authors have illustrated that with the introduction of knowledge about the system 527 
capabilities and limitations, “trust in the system” increases, to similar trust ratings for low-capability 528 
and high-capability systems. These results differ from the study in (Helldin et al., 2013) and (Hergeth, 529 
Lorenz and Krems, 2017). While these studies did provide some feedback about the system 530 
boundaries to the drivers, they were unable to instil knowledge-based behaviour as they didn’t 531 
mention how the system works due to which the driver’s higher level mental model could not be 532 
made.  533 
It is worth noting that the effect of knowledge on “trust in the system” had a statistically highly 534 
significant relationship (p = 0.000002), the effect of knowledge on “trust with the system” was 535 
statistically not significant (p = 0.065). This can be explained by analysing the nature of knowledge 536 
provided to the participants. As mentioned in section 1.1.2, knowledge can be qualitatively classified 537 
into three categories. In the study presented, participants were provided with only static knowledge 538 
about the capabilities and limitations of the systems. While this allowed them to demonstrate their 539 
knowledge-based behaviour and helped them calibrate their trust in the system, the lack of system 540 
feedback on the real-time state and intention of the system, led to lower levels of trust with the 541 
system. This inference is further corroborated by the qualitative feedback from participants who were 542 
asked to explain their rating of trust in their own words. One of the participants (participant #20) 543 
commented: “warnings from the car missing” while other (participant # 40) commented “no 544 
warnings & notification”. Another participant (participant #37) mentioned: “I was able to 545 
accommodate for the system but it was discomforting… near misses and close calls”. 546 
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In other words, the introduction of static knowledge provided participants the capability to 547 
demonstrate top-down understanding as per the abstraction hierarchy levels. However, with the 548 
absence of dynamic knowledge, they were unable to get feedback (signs and signals) on the causes of 549 
the failure, subsequently their reasoning capability was limited. Thus, in order to be able to work with 550 
the system, i.e. accommodate for the limitations of the system and display their knowledge-based 551 
behaviour appropriately, participants also require real-time knowledge (e.g. signals and signs) to 552 
move the decision task to a higher or a lower abstraction level in search of pre-existing rules or 553 
intuition, similar to a co-pilot in the aviation domain (Eriksson and Stanton, 2017). Thus, the authors 554 
suggest that “trust with the system” is potentially influenced to a larger extent by dynamic (real-time) 555 
knowledge about the system capabilities and limitation. 556 
The introduction of knowledge didn’t have an interaction effect with automation capability on trust 557 
ratings (p = 0.059 for “trust in the system” and p = 0.065 for “trust with the system” ratings). Thus 558 
suggesting that similar levels of trust can be achieved if knowledge about the true capabilities and 559 
limitations of the systems is provided to the driver. 560 
While due to the study design the control group’s trust ratings can’t be compared with the low-561 
capability automation or high-capability automation group’s trust ratings, they do provide more 562 
confidence in the results obtained in the two latter groups. The role of the control group was to either 563 
support or negate the hypothesis that any change in trust ratings could be a result of experience. 564 
Results showed that automation capability has no interaction effect on experience of the system (p = 565 
0.89), thus negating the hypothesis. 566 
4.1. Informed Safety 567 
Results from this study could infer that vehicle manufacturers may choose to introduce low-capability 568 
systems and provide knowledge in order to deliver increased user trust and overall system 569 
performance. However, there is a caveat to this inference. For low capability automation, while 570 
introduction of knowledge increased the level of trust in the system significantly (from 32.4% to 571 
65.4%), it also increased the number of false presses significantly (from 0.476 to 2.67). Therefore, 572 
very low capability and too much knowledge is also not an appropriate solution. The authors believe 573 
that there is an optimum level of system capability and knowledge to be imparted at which trust could 574 
be maximized and false presses could be minimized. Therefore, manufacturers may decide to enhance 575 
automation capability by providing knowledge. Until systems are fully (100%) capable, augmenting 576 
system capability with knowledge about the system’s true capabilities, could be a method to bridge 577 
the gap in trust. In other words, while manufacturers should aim to introduce high capability systems 578 
in the market, the gap in system capability (system limitations) should be provided as knowledge to 579 
the customers to ensure high trust in the system. 580 
It is important to appreciate the difference in the manner in which non-specialists (i.e. general public) 581 
would understand / interpret the knowledge imparted to them. As creators of the system, designers 582 
and engineers have an appreciation and inclination towards technical understanding and the technical 583 
feature explanation. Therefore, in this study care was taken in the language used in the script used to 584 
impart knowledge to the participants. Use of technical jargon terms was avoided and illustrations were 585 
used as examples to help participants visualize the system. In real life, it is important that 586 
manufacturers explain the system capabilities and limitations in a non-technical manner in order to aid 587 
customer’s understanding by providing examples and ensuring the people read the provided 588 
information.  589 
This paper introduces the concept of “informed safety”, as a means to calibrate trust to the appropriate 590 
levels, which may include increasing those with low trust in capabilities or even reducing trust in 591 
those with too much confidence in what the system can achieve by making them aware of system 592 
boundaries. Informed safety means informing the driver (via static and/or dynamic knowledge) about 593 
the safety limits of the automated system and its intention. Informed safety provides the ability to 594 
display knowledge-based behaviour to shift the interpretation of a scenario to higher abstraction level 595 
or a lower abstraction level (Rasmussen, 1983). Informed safety aids the driver to interpret an 596 
unexpected situation to adopt an appropriate tactical or strategic manoeuvre to handle the situation 597 
safely. Informed safety is not just about providing rules of usage, it includes the background 598 
information, understanding and knowledge about how the system operates.  599 
4.2. Future research 600 
It is a well-known fact that users don't read manuals and that vehicle dealers/Original Equipment 601 
Manufacturers (OEMs) rarely do a good job in sufficiently or appropriately informing customers 602 
about the system capabilities and limitations (Beggiato and Krems, 2013; Eichelberger and McCartt, 603 
2014; Larsson, Kircher and Hultgren, 2014). As automated systems are introduced, innovative 604 
methods of informing the driver (customer) to create an “informed safety” level, need to be 605 
implemented. One potential solution could be providing a virtual tour of the vehicle at the dealership, 606 
which gives the customers an immersive experience of the various features and can help them 607 
calibrate their mental models and their expectations from the vehicle. Other means of providing 608 
“informed safety” may be short videos on the working of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) or 609 
specifically designed voice assistant features. All the discussed methods may form a part of the initial 610 
showroom briefing or a pre-sale briefing. However, these methods need to be evaluated to measure 611 
their effectiveness.  612 
4.3. Study limitations 613 
The WMG’s 3xD simulator provides a fully immersive driving experience for participants. However, 614 
like all simulator studies, transferability of results to real world needs to be evaluated separately. Real-615 
world evaluation of trust remains out of the scope of this paper. Additionally, as discussed in section 616 
4.1, informed safety, as introduced in this paper, has two facets: 1) static knowledge (e.g. initial 617 
briefing and driving manual) and 2) dynamic knowledge such as human-machine interface. In this 618 
paper, the authors only provided static informed safety to drivers. Future studies are planned where 619 
participants will be provided both dynamic knowledge and static knowledge. Results will be 620 
published in future publications. 621 
5. Conclusion 622 
Trust in automated systems is one of the key factors that would help realize the potential benefits 623 
offered by the introduction of automation in vehicles. However, trust level needs to be calibrated to 624 
the appropriate level in order to reap the benefits of the automated systems in a safe manner by 625 
preventing misuse or disuse. This study explores the effect of knowledge about the automation 626 
capability on trust in the system. 627 
In this paper, the authors demonstrate via a 56 participants driving simulator study that “trust in the 628 
system” increases with the introduction of static knowledge about the capabilities and limitation of the 629 
automated system. With the introduction of static knowledge, trust in the system for both low 630 
capability automation and high capability automation were not significantly different, 65.4% and 631 
70.5% respectively, suggesting no influence of automation capability on trust in the system when 632 
knowledge is provided to the drivers. Based on results, the authors introduced the concept of 633 
“informed safety” which helps calibrate drivers’ trust to an appropriate level, subsequently ensuring 634 
safe use of the automated system. 635 
Interestingly, with the introduction of static knowledge the average number of false presses had 636 
contrasting results for the two automation groups. With the introduction of knowledge, for the high 637 
capability automation group, the average number of false presses decreased from 1.73 to 1.36, while it 638 
increased from 0.47 to 2.67 for the low capability automation group. However, average number of 639 
accidents decreased from 1 to 0.38 and from 0.58 to 0.42 for low capability automation and high 640 
capability automation respectively. The improved safety with the introduction knowledge lends its 641 
support to the concept of informed safety. In order to reduce the number of false presses, the authors 642 
hypothesize the need to provide “informed safety” in a dynamic manner, i.e., via knowledge about the 643 
automation state and health through the HMI system. Results on the study exploring the hypothesis 644 
will be presented in future publications. 645 
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